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AI and Affordances for Mental Action 
Dr Tom McClelland1 
 
Abstract. To perceive an affordance is to perceive an object or 
situation as presenting an opportunity for action. The concept of 
affordances has been taken up across wide range of disciplines, 
including AI. I explore an interesting extension of the concept of 
affordances in robotics. Among the affordances that artificial 
systems have been engineered to detect are affordances to 
deliberate. In psychology, affordances are typically limited to 
bodily action, so the it is noteworthy that AI researchers have 
found it helpful to extend the concept to encompass mental 
actions. I propose that psychologists can learn from this 
extension, and argue that human subjects can perceive mental 
affordances, such as affordances to attend, affordances to 
imagine and affordances to count. 
1 INTRODUCTION1 
The relationship between behavioural 
psychology and artificial intelligence is 
reciprocal: just as AI researchers can apply 
lessons from psychology to artificial behaviour, 
psychologists can apply lessons from AI to 
human behaviour. In some cases, these 
interactions will have a cyclic structure, with 
one discipline inspiring new ideas in the other, 
then those ideas in turn being taken up by the 
original discipline. Although this reciprocal 
arrangement has yielded a wealth of results, 
there are doubtless a vast range of lessons that 
remain unrecognised. Put another way, there are 
surely insights in each discipline that could be 
fruitfully taken up by the other, but which have 
not yet been extracted. My aim in this paper is to 
extract one such lesson from AI and to present 
some proposals about how it might be applied to 
human behaviour. I start with an insight from 
psychology – the role of affordance perception 
in human behaviour – and consider how this 
insight has stimulated new ideas in AI. I then 
consider how one of these ideas – Raubal’s [11, 
12] notion of mental affordances in robotics – 
moves beyond the understanding of affordances 
offered by psychologists. Finally, I explore how 
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the notion of mental affordances might be 
applied in human psychology, and how it might 
be further developed in AI. 
2 APPLYING AFFORDANCE THEORY TO AI 
The concept of affordances was introduced by 
the ecological psychologist J.J. Gibson, and his 
most fully developed articulation of the concept 
can be found in his 1979 work The Ecological 
Approach to Visual Perception [1]. In that book,  
Gibson introduces the concept of affordances 
as follows: 
The affordances of the environment are what 
it offers the animal, what it provides or 
furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to 
afford is found in the dictionary, but the 
noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I 
mean by it something that refers to both the 
environment and the animal in a way that no 
existing term does. It implies the 
complementarity of the animal and the 
environment. [1, p.127] 
Classic cases of affordances are those 
pertaining to basic bodily actions such as 
walking, gripping or catching. A path might 
afford walking, a stick might afford gripping 
and a ball might afford catching. Whether 
something has these affordances depends on the 
body and abilities of the agent: a ball that 
affords catching for one agent might not afford 
catching for another. 
At the heart of the concept of affordances is 
a specific understanding of the relationship 
between action and perception. Gibson’s key 
theoretical claim is that agents do not perceive 
an action-neutral environment then infer what 
actions are available to them in an environment 
with those properties. Instead, agents can simply 
perceive opportunities for action.  
For Gibson, this claim was part of a radical 
understanding of behaviour according to which 
internal processes are unnecessary for 
perception, or for the transition from perception 
to action. Agents can pick-up affordances by 
directly perceiving optical patterns in the 
environment, and these affordances can directly 
guide action without the need for mediating 
processes. 
Some in the ecological school of psychology 
have sought to retain this radical understanding 
of behaviour. However, the majority of those 
who have taken up Gibson’s concept of 
affordances have left these bolder claims behind. 
AI is no exception to this. Horton et al [7] note 
that AI researchers understand affordance 
perception in terms of internal representations of 
opportunities for action – a concession to 
dualism that Gibson would doubtless have 
resisted. But if perceiving and acting on 
affordances is taken to require internal 
representation, what value is there in the 
concept? Horton et al outline the application of 
affordances to AI as follows: 
In designing artificial agents, several 
successful patterns for control and 
coordination of perception and action have 
emerged. Some of these approaches share an 
important characteristic - a clear emphasis on 
utilizing the environment, and the agent’s 
interaction with it, to reduce the complexity 
of representation and reasoning. This 
characteristic is founded on an ecological 
view of the agent - an entity embodied in a 
world rich with observable cues that can help 
guide the agent’s behavior. [2, p.71] 
By programming behaviour in a way that’s 
sensitive to environmental affordances, one can 
thus minimize the need for internal 
representations. This is a valuable result even if 
the Gibsonian dream of eliminating internal 
processing entirely is deemed unattainable [2, 
p.79]. An especially interesting consequence of 
affordance-based programming is that agents 
with such programming engage in exploratory 
behaviour. This behaviour is not directed toward 
any specific goal, but by interacting with items 
in the environment in a variety of ways the agent 
discovers the opportunities for action presented 
by that object, and by other objects of the same 
kind. Stoytchev [16], for instance, offers a 
distinctive approach to tool-learning in robotics 
that involves the robot engaging in random 
‘dabbling’ behaviour toward a presented tool. 
The robot performs a variety of random actions 
on the tools and learns the results of these 
actions. By engaging in this behaviour, the robot 
is then able to perform a tool-using task that 
they would have been unable to perform without 
the lessons learned from their earlier goal-
independent exploration. 
3 MENTAL AFFORDANCES IN AI 
The affordances discussed by Gibson (and by 
the vast majority of those who have picked up 
on his term) are affordances for bodily action. 
As mentioned above, classic affordances include 
affording walking, affording gripping and 
affording catching. The affordances explored in 
AI research are almost universally affordances 
for bodily action in the sense that they involve 
some kind of physical movement on the part of 
the artificial agent (whether it be virtual 
movement in a simulation or actual movement 
through an artificial body). Examples include 
affordances for poking, pushing, pulling, 
rotating and lifting [2, p.73]. However, in a 
small number of cases AI researchers talk about 
affordances for mental action. Consider the 
following passage from Raubal & Moratz: 
…a public transportation terminal affords for 
a person to enter different buses and trains. It 
also affords to buy tickets or make a phone 
call. A path affords remembering and 
selecting, a decision point affords orienting 
and deciding, etc. In general, such situations 
offer for the person the mental affordance of 
deciding which of the perceived affordances 
to utilize according to her goal. [11, p.3] 
Some of the affordances cited in this passage 
are affordances for bodily actions, such as the 
bodily act of getting on a specific bus. But the 
‘mental affordances’ are affordances for mental 
action, such as the mental act of deciding what 
to do. Raubal & Moratz offer an affordance-
oriented robot architecture that includes 
sensitivity to these mental affordances. They 
explain this architecture as follows: 
Mental affordances (Maff) arise for the agent 
when perceiving a set of physical and social-
institutional affordances in an environment 
at a specific location and time. Affordances 
offer possibilities for action as well as 
possibilities for the agent to reason about 
them and decide whether to utilize them or 
not, i.e., mental affordances. The agent needs 
to perform an internal operation Op (Int) to 
utilize a mental affordance.  Internal 
operations are carried out on the agent’s 
beliefs (including its history and 
experiences) and lead to an internal outcome 
O (Int). In order to transfer such outcome to 
the world, the agent has to perform an 
external operation Op (Ext), which then 
leads to an external outcome O (Ext), i.e., 
some change of the external world. [11, pp. 
95-96] 
So besides being sensitive to specific 
affordances for physical action, the robot is 
sensitive to situations in which a decision is 
required [11, 12]. The opportunities for physical 
action can be understood as first-order 
affordances. The situations in which a decision 
is required can be understood as second-order 
affordances, as they are affordances to decide 
between first-order affordances. Raubal & 
Moratz argue that this architecture better enables 
robots to respond to a dynamic environment. 
Furthermore, the process of explicit deliberation 
allows them to communicate plans before they 
are acted upon. Although they don’t draw 
explicitly on Raubal & Moratz, Saratha & 
Scheutz have also recently argued that uptake of 
such second-order affordances enhances 
performance in various ways [14]. 
4 DEVELOPING MENTAL AFFORDANCES 
Raubal & Moratz [11] emphasise that one of the 
advantages of their mental affordance-based 
architecture is that it better corresponds to the 
architecture of human behaviour. However, 
when one looks at how the concept of 
affordances is used in the psychology literature, 
one finds virtually no reference to affordances 
for mental actions such as affording 
deliberation. Psychology did AI a service with 
the notion of affordances. Perhaps here AI can 
return the favour. I propose that the notion of 
mental affordances opens up a range of 
promising avenues of enquiry for the 
understanding of human behaviour. 
Raubal & Moratz’s [11] example of 
affording deliberation is an obvious initial 
target. Do human agents perceive opportunities 
to make a decision? Does the concept of 
affordances for deliberation allow us to offer 
better explanations of when and how humans 
engage in explicit decision making? It certainly 
seems to fit with our phenomenology that 
situations afford deliberation: just as we 
experience a single open path as demanding to 
be walked down, we experience a fork in the 
path as demanding an act of explicit deliberation 
about which path to take. Although affordance-
based theories are ultimately answerable to the 
empirical data, their phenomenological 
plausibility is responsible for a great deal of 
their appeal [6]. If the notion of mental 
affordances tallies with our phenomenology, this 
would be an important point in its favour. 
Moving beyond affordances for deliberation, 
we can explore the possibility of other 
affordances for mental action. I introduce three 
kinds of affordance: affording covert attention; 
affording covert bodily actions; and affording 
counting. 
Certain stimuli present opportunities for us 
to perform the act of attending, and some of 
these stimuli positively call out to be attended 
to. Consider the experience of trying to 
concentrate on some work when a radio is being 
played outside. The radio calls out for our 
attention but with effort we can keep our 
attention trained on our work. 
The way that stimuli invite attention is 
naturally described in terms of affordances. 
Attending is an act, and the radio outside 
presents an opportunity to perform this act. Our 
sensitivity to such opportunities is perceptual. 
One doesn’t hear the loud bang and infer that 
one ought to direct one’s attention to it: one is 
aware of the radio as a suitable target for 
attention without the need for any such 
inference. Furthermore, if the radio’s claim on 
our attention were just a matter of believing that 
the radio should be attended to then it would be 
easy to reason ourselves out of being distracted 
by the noise. However, like many (if not all) 
perceptual states the representation of the radio 
as demanding attention is cognitively 
impenetrable. Crucially though, this does not 
mean that attention is outside our voluntary 
control. When we hear a loud bang, we cannot 
help but attend to it, but this is not the scenario 
under discussion. In our scenario, we succeed in 
keeping our focal attention trained on our work. 
As such, the radio does not trigger an obligatory 
involuntary act of attending. What is 
involuntary, however, is our perception of the 
radio as affording attention: we are free to 
ignore its call, but powerless to silence that call. 
These considerations indicate that we 
perceive opportunities to attend. But is the act of 
attending mental or bodily? Overt attention is 
the bodily act of directing one’s sense organs 
toward a particular stimulus, property or region. 
Covert attention is the mental act of 
concentrating on a particular perceived stimulus, 
property or region. These two layers of attention 
typically coincide: the focus of our gaze is 
normally the focus of our covert attention. That 
said, the two activities must nevertheless be 
distinct since they are dissociable: one can 
deliberately direct one’s covert attention toward 
things other than the target of one’s overt 
attention. Stimuli that afford attention thus 
afford not just a bodily act, but a mental act. 
Alternatively, we might say that when stimuli 
afford attention they afford a complex act that is 
at least partly mental. This would still be a 
significant departure from the straightforwardly 
bodily acts normally cited in the affordance 
literature. 
Some objections might be raised against this 
conclusion. First, one might object that stimuli 
only afford overt attention. On this view, a loud 
noise affords the bodily act of turning one’s 
head toward it but does not afford the mental act 
of covertly attending to it. Against this 
objection, I would respond that when a stimulus 
affords overt attention is clearly affords covert 
attention too. We do not, for instance, find 
ourselves suddenly turning toward a loud noise 
whilst keeping our concentration firmly on a 
prior task. In response to this, one might object 
that we perceive affordances for overt attention, 
and that when we overtly attend to something 
our covert attention follows suit. As such, our 
covert attention is not guided by perceived 
affordances for to perform the mental act of 
covertly attending. Rather, it is guided by overt 
attention which is in turn guided by perceived 
affordances to perform the bodily act of overtly 
attending. The difficulty with this response is 
that it is at odds with the empirical data. Covert 
attention has been found to precede involuntary 
eye movements [9], so it cannot be the case that 
covert attention merely rides on the coat-tails of 
overt attention. 
I suggest that the concept of affordances for 
covert attention could be of value to 
psychologists. And continuing the cycle of 
innovation, affordances for covert attention may 
prove useful in AI. Researchers have already 
programmed artificial agents with a capacity for 
covert attention [17]. As with any action that an 
artificial agent is able to perform, there are 
different ways of programming how and when 
the agent elects to exercise that capacity. We 
have already touched on the benefits obtained 
when an artificial agent is programmed to 
exercise its capacities for physical behaviour in 
response to perceived affordances in the 
environment. Perhaps parallel benefits could be 
obtained by making an artificial agent’s capacity 
for covert attention responsive to affordances to 
attend in the environment. 
Moving on from covert attention, I suggest 
that we might also perceive affordances to 
mentally rehearse a bodily action. Sometimes 
we perform bodily acts in our mind: we rehearse 
them in imagination without actually performing 
them. Interestingly, the neural realisation of an 
imagined bodily act overlaps extensively with 
the neural realisation of actually performing that 
act [8]. This suggests that to imagine an action is 
simply to perform that action ‘off-line’. If we 
can perceive affordances to perform a bodily 
action overtly, there could also be affordances to 
perform that same action covertly.  
Consider a situation in which someone is 
sitting opposite you at a table, and you wish to 
know how the items on the table are arranged 
from their perspective: for instance, from their 
perspective is the fork to the right of their plate 
or the left? To work this out you could rotate 
your body round to the other agent’s position 
and observe how the items appear from this new 
position. A more economical alternative, 
however, is to perform such self-rotation 
mentally and ‘see’ how those items appear 
without having to move a muscle. Psychologists 
such as Kessler & Thomson [8] have provided 
experimental evidence that when we adopt 
another agent’s spatial perspective we perform 
exactly this kind of mental self-rotation. The 
situation described thus presents an opportunity 
for mental self-rotation. Do we perceive this 
opportunity to perform the relevant mental act or 
only infer it? The existing data does not offer a 
definitive answer to this question. Anecdotally 
though, it does not seem that we first perceive 
our situation then infer that mental self-rotation 
would reveal the desired information about the 
other agent’s perspective. Rather, the 
availability of this mental act is immediately 
apparent to us: it is perceived not inferred. 
If this line of thought is sound, then the 
notion of affordances to perform off-line bodily 
activities could be of theoretical value in 
psychology. Again though, there could also be 
interesting applications in AI. Many artificial 
agents exploit off-line rehearsal of physical 
actions [15]. Programming agents to be 
responsive to affordances to perform such 
rehearsals could yield the same kind of cognitive 
advantage achieved by agents that are 
responsive to affordances to perform overt 
bodily actions. 
My final proposed mental affordances are 
affordance to count. Counting is a mental act. 
Sometimes we count in a way that involves a 
bodily act of pointing to items and numbering 
them out loud. Sometimes we count in a way 
that involves doing those bodily acts off-line e.g. 
by pointing and numbering in our heads. It is 
implausible, however, that the act of counting is 
exhausted by such overt or covert bodily action. 
We can count things without performing either 
of these acts, and we have a brain area – the 
intraparietal sulcus – that is directly associated 
with arithmetic without being directly 
implicated in those bodily acts [3]. My target 
here is what you might call unassisted counting: 
a way of counting that depends on neither overt 
nor covert bodily action. Our environment can 
present opportunities for counting. Consider a 
pile of pennies, or the leaves on a clover, or the 
cards remaining in a poker deck. 
A strong consideration in favour of 
affordances for counting comes from 
pathological cases. To appreciate this evidence, 
we must first consider how pathological cases 
have informed our understanding of affordances 
for bodily action. Utilization behaviour is a 
disorder caused by specific brain damage to the 
frontal lobe and is characterised by subjects 
being compelled to ‘utilize’ any items that they 
see [1]. When presented with an apple, subjects 
eat it even when they are not hungry. When 
presented with a toothbrush, they use it to brush 
their teeth regardless of the context. When they 
are presented with pens, they draw with them 
even if there is no paper to draw on. This 
disorder has been explained with reference to 
affordance perception: subjects perceive an 
opportunity to act but are unable to suppress the 
impulse to exploit this opportunity [13, 2]. 
Where a typical subject perceives that the apple 
affords eating, there is evidence that the motor 
pathways responsible for grabbing and eating 
the apple are triggered. If the agent elects to eat 
the apple, these motor signals result in the 
bodily action, but more often the agent will 
suppress this signal: they perceive the 
opportunity to eat but do not act on it. However, 
due to their frontal lobe damage, agents 
suffering from utilization behaviour are unable 
to suppress these signals so perform whatever 
act they perceive to be afforded. Parallel claims 
have been made in the context of OCD: the 
compulsive behaviour of sufferers of OCD can 
be described in terms of the distinctive ways in 
which they perceive and act on environmental 
affordances for bodily action [5]. 
How do these considerations about the role 
of affordance perception in certain kinds of 
pathological behaviour help us in our project of 
exploring the possibility of mental affordances? 
Many of the pathological behaviours discussed 
by researchers are bodily acts and, 
correspondingly, are explained in terms of 
affordances for bodily action. Some behaviours, 
however, are more plausibly regarded as 
pathological mental actions. Plausibly, such 
behaviour could be explained in terms of how 
subjects perceive and act on affordances for 
mental action. The patient suffering from 
utilization behaviour discussed by Brazzelli & 
Spinnler also showed a ‘compulsion to count’ 
[1, p. 350].2 If her compulsive consumption of a 
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presented apple is to be explained in terms of 
her perception of the apple as affording eating, 
and her subsequent failure to suppress the 
impulse to eat, then her compulsive counting 
should be explained in terms of her perception 
of items as affording counting, and her 
subsequent failure to suppress the impulse to 
count. 
It is worth noting that the patient’s 
symptoms are not naturally explained in terms 
of atypical behavioural urges: the characteristic 
feature of the disorder is that the patient’s 
behaviour is environment led, meaning that she 
acts on perceived opportunities for actions even 
if she has no desire to perform those actions. 
Consequently, the fact that she performs the act 
of counting on certain stimuli indicates that she 
perceives those stimuli as presenting an 
opportunity to count. Again, parallel conclusions 
can be reached about the explanation of 
compulsive counting in OCD patients [10]. 
Whether stimuli afford counting is ultimately 
answerable to empirical evidence that is not yet 
available. Again though, it seems that there 
would be something ad hoc about 
countenancing affordances for bodily action and 
not for mental action. If the compulsive bodily 
actions of Brazzelli & Spinnler’s patient are to 
be understood in terms of affordance perception 
then, other things being equal, the same view 
ought also to be taken toward her compulsive 
mental actions [1].  
If there can be affordances for counting, why 
not for other arithmetical actions? A pile of 
sweets, for example, might present an 
opportunity for division. And stimuli in the 
language of mathematics can present 
opportunities for far more sophisticated 
arithmetical actions. A maths exam paper, for 
instance, might present opportunities to square, 
to factorise and to exponentiate. 
Many artificial agents have within their 
repertoire the ability to perform mathematical 
operations on their environment. Armed with the 
concept of affordances for mathematical action, 
perhaps programmers could create artificial 
agents that are responsive to environmental 
opportunities to perform this mental act, with all 
the cognitive advantages entailed by such 
responsiveness. 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Psychology’s introduction of the concept of 
affordances has had valuable applications in 
artificial intelligence. One of these applications 
has been to extend the notion of affordances 
beyond bodily action to include mental acts such 
as deliberating about a choice. I have argued that 
this notion of mental affordances promises to 
have fruitful applications in human psychology, 
and to have useful further applications within 
artificial intelligence. To put this to the test, 
further work must be done on the ways in which 
agents recognise opportunities for mental action. 
In artificial intelligence, there is an 
opportunity to develop new cognitive 
architectures. Just as artificial agents 
programmed to perceive and act on affordances 
for bodily action have shown a range of 
advantages over more traditionally structured 
artificial agents, artificial agents programmed to 
perceive and act on affordances for mental 
action will enjoy parallel advantages. 
In human psychology, there is an 
opportunity to test whether and how human 
subjects perceive and act on opportunities for 
mental actions. A variety of experimental 
paradigms have been employed to establish 
whether and how we perceive affordances for 
bodily action, and many of these paradigms can 
be applied to investigate affordances for mental 
action. 
When considering affordance perception in 
both organic and artificial subjects, one 
important question is what value there is to 
perceiving affordances rather than inferring 
what opportunities for action are available from 
action-neutral perceptual inputs. One 
particularly promising line of enquiry is to 
explore the link between affordance-based 
architectures and exploration-based learning. If 
goal-independent physical dabbling with 
external objects allows agents to learn the 
affordances for physical action offered by 
external objects [16], perhaps goal-independent 
mental dabbling with external objects allows 
agents to learn the affordances for mental action 
offered by those objects. Many mental actions 
are performed on symbols, including linguistic 
and mathematical symbols. When we ‘play’ 
with symbols might we be learning about the 
mental actions they afford? One might even 
move beyond perceptible external stimuli and 
speculate that we can perform goal-independent 
mental dabbling with our own internal states. 
Perhaps such dabbling reveals opportunities for 
self-directed mental action that would not 
otherwise be recognised. 
This is just one of a host of promising 
avenues of enquiry opened up Raubal’s 
innocuous concept of affordances for 
deliberation. I hope that the full theoretical 
import of mental affordances will emerge over 
time, and yield valuable insights in psychology 
and AI alike. 
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